How the Water Disputes May Affect Geopolitics in Asia and Africa

Although fossil fuels are deemed the drivers of the modern economy, other natural resources are also valuable. For instance, the lack of water threatens to destabilize African and Asian regions right now.

The relentless surge in water demand, escalating environmental challenges, and reckless management push the world's water resources to the brink. According to projections from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, global water withdrawals are set to skyrocket by 55 percent by 2050 compared to levels in 2000, fueled by the insatiable thirst of industries, energy production, and household consumption. The United Nations warns that to nourish a growing global population, agricultural output must soar by 50 percent by mid-century, leading to a staggering 30 percent increase in water withdrawals from today's figures.

However, many of the world's major river basins and vital groundwater aquifers have already hit or even exceeded the thresholds of their renewable resources. A recent global study reveals a concerning reality: 2 to 3 billion people inhabit areas where their water withdrawals surpass available renewable supplies for up to half the year. Alarmingly, half a billion individuals face a grimmer fate, with their demand outstripping supply year-round.

The Brahmaputra River, an expansive waterway stretching approximately 2,900 kilometers, originates high in the Tibetan Plateau, where it takes shape as the Yarlung Tsangpo River. From Tibet, it flows southward, carving its path through the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. As its journey continues, the Brahmaputra winds through various landscapes, eventually merging with the Ganges River in Bangladesh before emptying into the vast Bay of Bengal. This river is a vital lifeline for the three countries it traverses, each relying on its waters for different essential needs.

In China, the river's potential for hydroelectricity generation has been harnessed by constructing a series of hydroelectric plants on the Tibetan Plateau. This development is particularly significant for a country that faces increasing energy demands, as the river provides a renewable power source.

However, like many of the world's rivers, the Brahmaputra is facing increasing pressure from growing freshwater demand in upstream and downstream states. The increasing population, industrialization, and agricultural expansion are straining this finite resource. Consequently, sustainable river management is becoming a pressing concern for all three nations. Each country must consider its developmental needs while ensuring that the river remains a viable water source for future generations.

Diplomatic skirmishes over transboundary water resources have sometimes been termed "water wars." Following the establishment of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, India has accused China of interfering in its water disputes with Pakistan. A decade ago, research indicated that China's water diplomacy was limited due to institutional constraints. Domestically, various agencies managed water resources piecemeal, viewing them through different economic lenses.

Historically, China has had a minimal role in multilateral water cooperation; for instance, it was not part of the Mekong Committee from 1957 to 1995 and only became a "Dialogue Partner" in 1996. However, by 2024, improvements have been noted in China's transboundary water management. Although a single regulatory agency remains absent, the Foreign Ministry now plays a more significant role. In 2017, China launched the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation platform, underscoring its upstream influence.

What should we expect from both countries?

China's restrained reaction to the Galwan clash with India, including limited state media coverage and delayed acknowledgment of casualties, contrasts sharply with its typical use of economic coercion. Beijing condemned India's economic measures, such as mobile app bans and FDI restrictions, labeling them discriminatory while emphasizing the need to separate the border dispute from broader relations. As a significant trading partner with substantial exports, China's economic advantage over India allowed it to wait for a more favorable Indian stance.

In 2024, India indicated a willingness to relax its economic measures, with officials hinting at easing restrictions on Chinese investments if the border remained stable. Following a Sino-Indian agreement in October 2024, stability improved, prompting domestic industries to advocate for increased Chinese investment. However, skepticism remains, as Chinese companies may still hesitate to operate in India due to a perceived unpredictable business environment. Measures like the "CCTV crackdown" could further complicate Chinese business operations. Ultimately, India's current selective approach to Chinese investments marks a shift from its previous strategies from 2020 to 2023, aiming for a more measured engagement with China.

Meanwhile, the conflict over the resources of the River Nile has been a source of tension in North Africa for many years. In 2011, the Ethiopian government revealed its intention to construct the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) – a hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile near the Sudanese border, with a capacity of 5,000 MW and an estimated cost of $4.1 billion. The purpose of the dam is to harness Ethiopia's significant hydroelectric potential and supply electricity not only to Ethiopians but also to communities across the Horn of Africa. Nonetheless, there are concerns that the dam may merely replace one issue with another. Furthermore, while Ethiopia may enhance its energy resources, it could put its water security at risk by increasing the unpredictability of a river that has a longstanding reputation for being difficult to forecast.

In October, Egypt hosted a summit with Eritrea and Somalia, solidifying regional military cooperation and pledging troops to Somalia's counterterrorism efforts under the African Union. This is part of Egypt's broader strategy to counter Ethiopia's growing influence in the Horn of Africa, highlighted by Addis Ababa's deal with Somaliland to establish a military base in exchange for recognizing Somaliland's independence.

Tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam which threatens Egypt's water security, and the Entebbe Agreement, recently ratified by South Sudan, which challenges Egypt and Sudan's historical Nile water rights. GERD's unilateral construction has significantly reduced Egypt's water supply, forcing reliance on costly measures like wastewater treatment and crop restrictions.

Egypt's increasing military engagement with African nations, including defense agreements with Somalia and Eritrea, reflects a shift toward security-driven alliances. Analysts suggest these moves aim to challenge Ethiopia's dominance, especially regarding GERD and its partnerships in the Nile Basin. Ethiopia's perceived expansionism, such as supporting Somaliland's independence, has pushed nations like Eritrea closer to Egypt.

Egypt's renewed African focus contrasts with its declining influence since the Nasser era, which prioritized African unity. Critics argue subsequent leaders de-emphasized Africa, while Ethiopia capitalized on this vacuum to bolster its regional standing. Egypt's recent efforts to rebuild ties may signal a potential escalation with Ethiopia, but they also represent a strategy to compel negotiations over shared water and regional interests.

So, in both Asia and Africa, water disputes have not overflown into full-fledged military conflicts. However, the situation may change as the scarcity of this precious resource only rises.